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Owen M. Fiss*
Jacques Maury and Maurice Garc;on were good people, but
not good enp~gh. They resisted the harshness of the racial laws of
Vichy France but not as fully as they should have. Falling victim to
the proclivity of all lawyers, they became ensnared within the tech-
nical trappings of the law. They helped individual clients who suf-
fered under the Vichy laws, but are faulted by Richard Weisberg
for failing to challenge those laws at a foundational level.1 Profes-
sor Weisberg described the result as grotesque.
When viewed from such a perspective, one might be tempted
to celebrate the work of another attorney-Richard Dana-as that
of the sublime? He was fully committed to the abolitionist cause
and participated in many of its activities. He stood up for Anthony
Burns in a proceeding brought against Burns under the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850. Dana was not paid for representing Burns, nor
was he compelled by a court or anyone else to render such assist-
ance: He volunteered. In the end, Dana lost. Anthony Burns was
delivered by Commissioner Loring to his master and returned to
servitude, but not without a good fight by Dana on both a technical
and foundational level.
As an initial stratagem, Dana managed to obtain a short con-
tinuance, so that Burns could decide whether or not he desired
Dana's representation. Then Dana turned what might have been a
summary rendition proceeding into a four-day public trial on the
validity of the Fugitive Slave Act and Burns's right to freedom.
Dana's aggressive lawyering constituted an important contribution
to the abolitionist cause. As Paul Finkelman acknowledges, it "ed-
ucated the North to the dangers of slavery and the South to the
power of antislavery."3
Yet Professor Finkelman is unprepared to let the matter rest
on this note. His inclination is not to praise, but rather to criticize
Dana. Thus, the acknowledgement of Dana's contribution to the
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abolitionist cause that I just quoted appears as but a grudging con-
cession. In a more critical vein, Finkelman remarks that "no one
listened to Burns,"4 and then adds that "[u]ltimately, [the aboli-
tionists'] help hurt him."s According to Finkelman, the gains of the
antislavery cause from the Burns case were secured at the expense
of an individual who never sought nor wanted the help of aboli-
tionists.6 Such a judgment seems too harsh, and juxtaposed with
Richard Weisberg's critique of the French lawyers, I have begun to
wonder, in these days of lawyer bashing, whether a lawyer can ever
do right.
Embedded in Professor Finkelman's critique of Dana are two
factual claims. The first-which seems false-is that Burns did not
want Dana's help. When Dana first volunteered, Burns did not
reject his offer of help, but merely expressed unease and reluctance
stating, "I shall fare worse if I resist."7 The decision confronting
Burns was a difficult one-it had to be made in a tense and highly
electric situation soon after the capture and with the master sitting
nearby. Commissioner Loring, true to the forms of the law, asked
Burns whether he wanted a delay so he could think about the mat-
ter, and ordered a two day continuance only after Burns agreed to
a delay. After the delay, Burns said he wanted to be represented
by Dana.
In the interim, Burns had been visited and advised by three
persons-two blacks (one Reverend Grimes, and the second, a Mr.
Pitt, for whom Burns had worked) and one white (Wendell Phillips,
the well-known abolitionist leader). Although Professor
Finkelman looks upon this visit with some concern, there is abso-
lutely no reason to assume that these persons had coerced or in any
other way unduly influenced Burns's choice. The more plausible
assumption is that they had helped Burns make a free and in-
formed choice to fight for his freedom and accept Dana's represen-
tation. Professor Finkelman criticizes Dana for ignoring Burns's
desires, yet, oddly, he discounts the possibility that Burns was
bravely and genuinely speaking for himself when he said he wanted
to be represented by Dana.
A second factual claim advanced by Professor Finkelman is
that Dana hurt Burns by resisting the rendition. Here, too, Profes-
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charge against Dana, Finkelman hypothesizes that Burns was pun-
ished by his master for the resistance, and that this punishment
"left Burns weak, ill, and permanently lame. It probably shortened
his life."8 It is true that following the rendition proceeding Burns
was kept in chains for several months. Yet such a measure may
have been intended simply to prevent another escape. Moreover,
even if it were retribution for the resistance, Professor Finkelman
overlooks the possibility that Burns would have been punished for
the original escape whether or not he had resisted the rendition.
We have no way of knowing whether the punishment was increased
due to the resistance or Dana's intervention, much less what toll an
increased punishment may have taken on Burns's physical well-be-
ing or whether it shortened his life.
This second claim about Dana's representation, and
Finkelman's insistence that it actually hurt Burns, can also be
faulted for failing to take into account a fact-buried in footnote
iSO-that a group of Bostonians, led by Grimes, subsequently
purchased Burns for $1300 and then had him manumitted. One
wonders whether this would have happened without Dana's in-
tercession, for it was his action that transformed Burns's rendition
into a drama of its own, and linked it forever with the abolitionist
cause.
Even assuming that Professor Finkelman's two factual
claims-that Burns did not want Dana's help and that the resist-
ance actually hurt Burns-are valid, I would still be reluctant to
condemn Dana's role in the case in quite the way that Finkelman
does. Even on Finkelman's facts, Dana was no officious intermed-
dler. Instead, he was an attorney struggling with a dilemma pres-
ent in all reform litigation: How can lawyers fight institutional
wrongs when they are limited to pursuing the narrow interests of
individual clients?
At stake in any rendition proceeding was the interest in free-
dom of the individual slave, more specifically, Burns's interest in
articulating and giving effect to his decisions, the right to speak for
himself and to be heard. Professor Finkelman fully grasps this in-
terest in freedom, but only this interest. For that reason, he is pre-
pared to place Burns wholly in control of this proceeding-even to
the point of allowing Burns to return to slavery quietly and without
a fight. What Finkelman overlooks, however, is the multidimen-
sional nature of freedom. The Burns rendition would have an im-
8 Id. at 1807 (footnote omitted).
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pact not only on Burns, but also on the interests of the slave
community as a whole and, for that matter, those of humanity. We
may make Burns's desires paramount. when only his individual
freedom is at stake, but not once we understand the multidimen-
sional nature of freedom and the fact that the continued existence
of slavery and the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act were
threats to everyone.
A broader understanding of the scope of interests at stake
might well vindicate Dana's defense of Burns, even on Finkelman's
account of the relationship between the two. Obviously, if Burns
did not want Dana to represent him, Dana may not have been able
to represent himself as Burns's lawyer. However, Dana could be
understood as a lawyer for the unnamed members of the class of
those subjected to slavery or the Fugitive Slave Act, or as the law-
yer for Phillips, Grimes., and Pitt, or, for abolitionists in general, or,
to use the progressive phrase, the lawyer for the situation.9 Dana
might have even participated in the proceeding as a friend of the
court.10
In invoking humanity's interest in freedom, Dana stands in
danger of substituting his own conception of the good-or that of
the privileged group to which he belongs-for that of the collectivi-
ties he is purporting to represent. This is a danger present in any
reform litigation or, to use Richard Weisberg's formula, whenever
a wrong is attacked at a foundational level. This danger must be
openly confronted, and should lead to a certain critical self-aware-
ness or modesty on the part of lawyers and an attentiveness to the
needs and interests of those on whose behalf they are fighting. Yet
it is also important to recognize that a lawyer must attend to the
interests of all the victims, and avoid the danger of privileging one
victim to the detriment of the class as a whole.
Although Dana most certainly should have listened to Burns,
there were others to which he should also have listened. Respond-
ing to those interests, may have put Dana in the position of sacrific-
ing an individual's interest to that of the larger collectivity, but
that, too, is sometimes unavoidable. Eradicating an evil as enor-
mous as slavery will necessarily harm many individuals. While
some of those harmed may be perpetrators of the wrong, many
9 See e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACI'ICE OF LAW 58-68 (1978)
(describing Brandeis's coining of the phrase "lawyer for the situation" to defend his role as
an attorney-mediator for various clients in a single transaction).
10 At the initial rendition hearing, Dana asked permission to address the Court as ami-
cus curiae. See Finkelman, supra note 2, at 1809.
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others may have no discernible relationship to the perpetration of
the wrong. Indeed, they may properly be regarded as its victims.
The sad truth is that sometimes we must take one step back in or-
der to take two steps forward. Often, there is no other way. We
recognize this in the field of battle, and it is no less true in the law.
Richard Weisberg rightly calls our attention to the horrors of
the hermeneutic of acceptance. What is missing from both papers,
and perhaps from our age in general, is a full appreciation of all
that is entailed in the hermeneutic of resistance.
